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IN THE LIGHT OF REASON
AND EXPERIENCE:
SHOULD FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW
PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SAME-SEX
PARTNERS?
ELIZABETH KIMBERLY (KYHM) PENFIL
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 embodies Congress's mandate that the
federal judiciary develop evidentiary privileges "in the light of reason
and experience." In considering whether to create a new evidentiary
privilege or to expand the scope of an existing one, federal courts
consider: (1) whether federal policy supports the privilege; (2) whether
states have recognized the privilege; (3) whether recognizing the
privilege serves the same policy goals that traditionally have informed
the development of privilege law; and (4) whether scholars have
advocated for the privilege's adoption.
The marital communications privilege protects confidential
communications made between spouses in a valid marriage. Recent
developments with respect to marriages or other unions between same-
sex partners raise the question whether confidential communications
between same-sex partners should be protected by the marital
communications privilege.
This Article details Congress's mandate that the judiciary develop
evidentiary privileges "in the light of reason and experience," examines
the history of and rationales for the marital communications privilege,
sets forth the analysis courts use to develop privilege law, explores how
courts might conduct that analysis when considering whether to protect
confidential communications between same-sex partners and addresses
some practical considerations that might arise in conducting that
analysis.
* A.B., Wellesley College; J.D., University of Southern California. I would like to thank
Scott Altman, Scott Bice, Linda Carter, David Cruz, Ariela Gross, Larry Levine, Francine
Lipman, Michael Shapiro, and Larry Simon for helpful comments on various drafts and for
illuminating discussions. I also thank Shelly Maas for her invaluable assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically grant the federal
judiciary control over the development of testimonial privileges: Rule
501 instructs federal courts to recognize and apply privileges "in the
light of reason and experience."1 Congress gave the federal judiciary
this mandate for flexibility so that it might shape new privilege law in
response to a dynamic society. And since the Rules were adopted in
1975, federal courts have wielded the mandate to apply privileges in
circumstances where they were not previously recognized. In exercising
"reason and experience," federal courts are guided by several factors:
(1) whether federal policy supports the privilege; (2) whether states
have recognized the privilege; (3) whether recognizing the privilege
serves the same policy goals that traditionally have informed the
development of privileges at common law; and (4) whether scholars
have advocated for the privilege's adoption.
The marital confidential communications privilege, which protects
confidential communications made between partners in a valid
marriage, had long been established at federal common law when the
Rules were adopted. Its long history illustrates both the importance of
the policy goals it serves and the extent to which it has become
embedded in the fabric of American law and society. Since the Rules
were adopted, the federal judiciary, despite some debate concerning the
privilege's utility, has continued to recognize and even to broaden the
scope of the marital communications privilege. This Article considers
whether federal courts should expand the scope of the privilege to
protect confidential communications between same-sex partners.2
Part II of this Article details Congress's mandate to the federal
judiciary to develop evidentiary privileges on a case-by-case basis "in
the light of reason and experience." Part III examines the history of,
and traditional rationales for, the marital communications privilege.
Part IV sets forth the four-part analysis that federal courts use when
developing privilege law under Rule 501's mandate for flexibility. Part
V explores how federal courts might conduct that analysis when
considering whether to protect confidential communications between
same-sex partners. Finally, Part VI addresses some practical
considerations that might arise in applying the marital communications
privilege to confidential communications between same-sex partners.
1. FED. R. EVID. 501.
2. Neither the debate concerning the utility of the marital communications privilege, nor
its sister privilege, the adverse spousal testimonial privilege, is examined in this Article.
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II. CONGRESS GRANTED THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY THE POWER TO
RECOGNIZE NEW EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES IN RESPONSE TO A
DYNAMIC SOCIETY
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975 after years of
consideration and debate. In 1962, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed
an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence to explore whether it was
advisable and feasible to establish federal rules of evidence.' The
Advisory Committee's preliminary report to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States answered that question in the affirmative.' Three years
later, in 1965, the Chief Justice instructed the Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence to draft these rules.5
The Advisory Committee held fourteen sessions in Washington,
D.C. between 1965 and 1968,6 and issued its first draft of the proposed
rules in 1969.' The preliminary draft was widely circulated to the bench,
bar, and academy, and comments were received through 1970.8 Based
on those comments, the Advisory Committee modified the proposed
rules in late 1970 and transmitted them to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference. 9 The
Standing Committee then approved the modified rules and transmitted
them to the Supreme Court in late 1970 with the recommendation that
they be enacted.1"
The Court republished the proposed rules for comment as the
Revised Draft.1" Based on comments received in response to the
3. A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules
of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75 (1962) [hereinafter
Preliminary Report].
4. Id. at 77.
5. Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 125,125 n.3 (1973).
6. Hearings On Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings].
7. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts
and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
8. Hearings, supra note 6, at 15.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
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Revised Draft, the Advisory Committee again modified the proposed
rules.'2 The Standing Committee approved that modified draft and sent
it to the Court in late 1971 with the suggestion that the rules be
enacted. 3
On November 20, 1972, the Court approved the new Rules of
Evidence for use as of July 1, 1973-unless vetoed by Congress within
ninety days of the Court's transmittal of the Rules to Congress." The
Court transmitted the Rules to Congress on February 5, 1973."s But
Congress, requiring more than ninety days to review the proposed rules,
passed legislation the following month that required express
congressional approval of the proposed rules before they went into
effect. 6
Having legislated time for a plenary review, Congress held extensive
hearings concerning the proposed federal rules of evidence in early
1973. The hearings spanned six days; twenty-five witnesses testified and
twenty-two witnesses submitted statements.'7 Based on the testimony it
had received, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice then proposed its own amendments to the Court's draft
of the proposed rules. 8 Those amendments were printed in the
Congressional Record and circulated nationwide for comment.' 9 After
receiving more than ninety comments, the Subcommittee revised its
proposed rules and, on October 10, 1973, submitted them to the House
Judiciary Committee for consideration. 2  The House Judiciary
Committee amended the Subcommittee's draft, published it on
November 15, 1973, and passed it on February 6, 1974.21
In June 1974, the Senate held hearings on the proposed rules,
passing them on November 22, 1974.22 After the House and Senate
12. Hearings, supra note 6, at 15.
13. Id.
14. Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
15. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 125 n.2.
16. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12.
17. See generally Hearings, supra note 6, at 1-589.
18. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 119 CONG. REC. H5452 (1973).
19. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,7078.
20. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice (formerly designated as
Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 357-59 (1973) [hereinafter
Supplement]; H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7078.
21. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7108.
22. Id.
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resolved differences between the two bills, Congress finally adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence on January 2, 1975. After years of research,
drafting, and analysis by the Court, by Congress and by the greater legal
community, the Rules became effective on July 1, 1975.23 For the first
time, there was a codified body of federal evidence law.
B. Evidentiary Privileges in American Jurisprudence
The Federal Rules of Evidence, like the federal common law of
privilege, are designed to facilitate accurate truth-finding." Testimonial
privileges, which allow otherwise admissible evidence to be excluded,
are an exception to the rule because they have the potential to hamper
accurate fact finding.25 Yet American jurisprudence has long recognized
testimonial privileges because, even though they "retard the truth-
seeking process,"26 they serve other, more important goals.27  Those
goals are both humanistic and instrumental.
Early Elizabethan cases relied on humanistic rationales in creating
testimonial privileges because "privileges reflected the legal system's
respect for human dignity." Indeed, early English courts held that the
disclosure of confidential information itself was morally wrong. 9 Under
the humanistic rationale, a privilege "embodi[es] ... the fundamental
23. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
24. FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed ... to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
25. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 65 (1973-74).
26. A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence before the Annual Judicial
Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 74 (1969) [hereinafter
Discussion].
27. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 65 ("to protect interests and relationships quite
apart from the goal of assuring accurate fact finding"); Discussion, supra note 26, at 74
(stating that "purpose is to serve extrinsic social policies"). See also David W. Louisell,
Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L.
REV. 101, 110 (1956-57), stating that:
[TJhere are [certain] things even more important to human liberty than accurate
adjudication. One of them is the right to be left by the state unmolested in certain
human relations.... [W]hatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused
by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in
certain communicative relations ..
Id.
28. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §
2.3 (2002).
29. Id.
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regard in which society does, and should, hold" individual rights."
Considered from the humanistic perspective, privileges protect
"significant human values"3 and are created "out of respect for personal
rights" 32 -especially privacy and autonomy.
33
Charles Wright and Kenneth Graham illustrate the crux of the
humanistic rationale when they observe that "[t]he question of privilege
is not really 'what are the empirical results of permitting this witness to
remain silent?;' it is 'what kind of people are we who empower courts in
our name to compel parents, friends, and lovers to become informants
on those who have trusted in them?""'3  This concern for individual
autonomy is the fundamental concept underlying the humanistic
rationale for confidential communication privileges.
In the eighteenth century, the humanistic rationale shifted to an
instrumental one: Jurists began to justify confidential communication
privileges by observing that, without such protection, the relationships
in question would suffer. 5 The latter articulation is largely a result of
the work of Lords Coke and Hardwicke.36 For example, Lord Coke,
speaking of the adverse spousal testimony privilege from which the
marital communications privilege derives, rationalized that forcing a
spouse to testify would "be a cause of implacable discord and
dissention"37 in the marriage. Lord Hardwicke, also addressing the
adverse spousal testimony privilege, explained that the privilege was
necessary to "preserve the peace of families." '38 In a modern twist on
Lord Coke's and Lord Hardwicke's work, Thomas Krattenmaker
observed that to ensure the protection of the few confidential utterances
that bear on litigation, the law by definition protects all those utterances
that may bear on it. 9
The instrumental rationale for testimonial privileges was most fully
and clearly articulated by John Henry Wigmore. '  Considered from
30. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 92.
31. Louisell, supra note 27, at 101.
32. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 5.1.2.
33. Id.
34. 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422.1 (Supp. 2000).
35. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 2.4.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing SIR EDWARD COKE ET AL., A COMMENTARIES UPON LITTLETON 6b
(1628)).
38. Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736).
39. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 92.
40. As has been keenly observed, Dean Wigmore was influenced strongly by Jeremy
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Wigmore's purely instrumental perspective, privileges are solely a
means to achieve an end-in the case of testimonial privileges, privacy,
autonomy, or freedom of speech. Testimonial privileges "provide a
barrier to officially sponsored penetration of private communications" 1
because they give citizens the power to control information about
themselves. 2 Although privacy can be-and often is-an end in itself,43
it also serves other ends. First, privacy promotes and protects personal
autonomy by providing both a context for emotional release and the
room for self-evaluation before making important life choices." Second,
privacy protects and promotes freedom of speech. A liberal democracy
depends on measured, free, and informed public debate. Yet without
the opportunity to first test one's speech in private, citizens cannot
participate fully in that debate.45 Thus, privileges serve a free society
because they allow citizens to test in a safe environment speech which,
once vetted and made public, informs the civic debate.46 Both of the
ends served by privacy-personal autonomy and an informed civic
debate made possible by freedom of speech-are central to a liberal
democracy. And testimonial privileges are one means to that end.
C. Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Advisory Committee's first draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was based almost solely on instrumental policy and,
consequently, eliminated most all confidential communications
privileges. When the Supreme Court transmitted its Proposed Rules to
Congress, Article V, relating to privileges, contained nine specific
privileges:
(1) required reports privileged by statute;
(2) lawyer-client privilege;
Bentham, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century British philosopher whose work
assumed the superiority of utilitarianism supported by empirical study. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 28, § 2.5.
41. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 85.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id. at 88 ("[P]rivacy is further an end in itself-an essential condition of political
liberty and.., humanity.").
44. Id. at 87.
45. Id. at 90.
46. Id. at 87-91.
47. Id. at 91 ("The Advisory Committee apparently subscribed to such [instrumental]
views.").
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(3) psychotherapist privilege;
(4) husband-wife privilege; 8
(5) communications to clergymen;
(6) political vote;
(7) trade secrets;
(8) secrets of state and other official information; and
(9) identity of informer. 9
Only those nine enumerated privileges would have existed under the
Court's proposed rules: All other privileges would have ceased to be
recognized, and the law of privilege would have been frozen in that
state.
Under the Supreme Court's proposed rules, "testimonial privileges
generally employed to protect individual, interpersonal relationships
[were] eviscerated, if not wholly omitted" in favor of privileges
protecting corporate information."' This included the marital
communications privilege, which was excluded from the Court's
proposed rules. Proposed Rule 505 would have codified only the
spousal testimonial privilege, which protects current spouses from
testifying against each other in criminal cases. 1 The federal marital
communications privilege, which protects forever confidential
communications made during a valid marriage, would have been
"quietly buried."52
The congressional hearings concerning the proposed rules
highlighted the controversy over whether there ought to be codified
federal rules of evidence and, in particular, how federal privilege law
ought to develop. Several witnesses testified that federal courts should
address the existence and application of privileges as those questions
arose before them.3 Other witnesses testified that Congress should
48. The husband-wife privilege was the adverse testimonial privilege, which allows a
criminal defendant to prohibit his or her spouse from testifying against him or her. The
Supreme Court's proposed rules "recognize[d] no privilege for confidential [marital]
communications." Proposed Rules, supra note 14, at 245 (Advisory Committee's Note).
49. Proposed Rules, supra note 14, at 234-58 (Proposed Rules 502-510).
50. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 66; Hearings, supra note 6, at 174 (statement of
Charles Halpern and George Frampton, Jr. on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers).
51. Proposed Rules, supra note 14, at 244 (Proposed Rule 505).
52. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 83.
53. See, e.g., Supplement, supra note 20, at 138-41 (statement of James Schaeffer on
behalf of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America), 192 (statement of Professor Charles
Black, Jr.), 307 (statement of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York); Hearings,
supra note 6, at 423 (statement of Alan Morrison on behalf Public Citizen, Inc.), 551 (reply
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enumerate specific privileges for the courts to apply.' In presenting the
final rules to Congress, William Hungate, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, who held the hearings,
noted that "fifty percent of the complaints in our committee related to
the section on privileges."55
In response to this controversy, the Judiciary Committee amended
Article V, eliminating the enumerated privileges and replacing them
with a mandate to the federal courts to identify and apply privileges on a
case-by-case basis.56 Rather than specifying which privileges then
recognized at common law would survive and forbidding federal courts
from recognizing any others, the Judiciary Committee "left the law of
privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall
continue to be developed by the courts of the United States. '' 57 This
version of the Rules, with its mandate of flexibility to the federal
judiciary, ultimately was adopted.
Thus, since 1975, Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence has
consisted solely of Rule 501, which provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience."
In short, federal courts are to recognize privileges "in the light of reason
and experience." Rule 501 "amounts to a total rejection of the
approach taken by the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court on
the matter of privileges-a rejection not only of the specific proposals
[of] the Committee and the Court, but also of the basic premises
Statement of Professor Edward Cleary).
54. See, e.g., Supplement, supra note 20, at 235 (statement of David Maddox), 285
(statement of Joseph McCarthy on behalf of the District of Columbia Bar), 1985 (statement
of Leonard Bucklin on behalf of the North Dakota State Bar); Hearings, supra note 6, at 422
(testimony of Alan Morrison), 443, 447 (statement of Alan Morrison).
55. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 6
(1974), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7108, 7110, also cited in Raymond F. Miller, Creating Evidentiary
Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 773 n.13 (1999).
56. H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7082-83.
57. Id. at 7082.
58. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
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underlying the proposal."5  Rather, Congress declared that "the
development of [federal] privilege law should not be codified by the
legislature, but instead should be continually developed and modified by
the courts. ' 6°
Rule 501's language, "reason and experience," derives from the
Supreme Court's 1934 opinion in Wolfle v. United States, 6 which
confirmed the importance of the marital communications privilege,
already long recognized at federal common law.62 Conrad Wolfe had
been prosecuted in a criminal matter. His letter to his wife had been
introduced into evidence over his objection that it was protected by the
marital communications privilege because the district court reasoned
that it had been unnecessarily dictated to a stenographer and was
therefore not made in confidence. 63 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
admission of the letter.64  The Supreme Court also affirmed the
admission of the letter, but noted the important role of the privilege:
"[T]he basis of the immunity given to communications between husband
and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so
essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh
the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege
entails. 65 In explaining the role privileges play, the Wolfe Court set
forth the test for determining when privileges, including the marital
communications privilege, ought to apply. The court stated that "rules
governing the competence of witnesses in criminal trials in the federal
courts are... governed by common law principles as interpreted and
applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience."66
By rejecting a clearly articulated, but static, set of privileges and
instead incorporating Wolfle's "reason and experience" standard into its
mandate, Congress demonstrated its belief that privilege law ought not
be frozen, but rather respond to a changing society. As the Senate
Report explained, Rule 501 "should be understood as reflecting the
59. 2 DAVID W. LoUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 635
(1985).
60. Miller, supra note 55 at 774-75. In one sense, then, the debate over Article V-
whether it should be a static set of clearly defined privileges or a mandate for dynamic
development-mirrors the debate between natural law theorists and legal positivists.
61. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis."67
Scholars, too, have recognized that the judiciary, because it can better
explain the rationales for privileges, because it minimizes the influence
of politically powerful groups who lobby for privileges, and because it
can create more flexible privileges than those enacted via legislation, is
in a better position than the legislature to develop evidence law. 6 And
courts consistently have recognized that Congress assigned them this
special role. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself noted that Congress's
adoption of Rule 501 "manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze
the law of privilege, 69 but to instead "'provide the courts with the
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis' and to
leave the door open to change." 70
III. THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
The marital communications privilege is a paradigmatic example of a
confidential communications privilege. The privilege protects: (1) a
communication, (2) that is confidential, and (3) that is made between
spouses during a valid marriage. 1 The federal marital communications
privilege applies in federal courts in all criminal cases and in civil cases
where federal law provides the rule of decision (i.e., in federal question
cases).73 It does not apply in diversity cases.
67. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).
68. Miller, supra note 55, at 781-92.
69. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
70. Id. at 47 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
71. United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 1993).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1985). Estes committed theft
and confessed his crime to his wife. Id. The district court admitted his wife's testimony
concerning his confession. Id. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
Estes's confession to his wife was privileged. Id.
73. See, e.g., Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 162 F.R.D. 490 (E.D.
Pa. 1995). Maria Caplan sued her former employer, the Fellheimer law firm, for violations of
Title VII. Helen Braverman, a partner at the firm who was the firm's counsel and also was
the wife of David Braverman, another partner at the firm, refused to answer deposition
questions, asserting the marital communications privilege. Id. Caplan brought a motion to
compel Mrs. Braverman's responses. Id. The trial court recognized the marital
communications privilege but, noting that Mrs. Braverman was conducting an internal
investigation at the time of the communications, held that the sole issue was whether the
communications were meant to be confidential. Id. The court thus ordered another
deposition at which it instructed Mrs. Braverman to either answer the questions or give more
detailed information about her basis for asserting the privilege. Id. at 492-93; see also Procter
& Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 909 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (upholding assertion
of privilege by Bankers Trust employee and his wife denying Proctor & Gamble's motion to
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As early as 1839, the Supreme Court had recognized the importance
of the marital communications privilege. In Stein v. Bowman,75 the
Court wrote:
[The privilege] is founded upon the deepest and soundest
principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of
those domestic relations, that constitute the basis of civil society;
and which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence
which should subsist between those who are connected by the
nearest and dearest relations of life. To break down or impair
the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and
wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.7 6
In Stein, the Court recognized the marital confidential communications
privilege and applied it to protect a widow from testifying about her
deceased husband's alleged efforts to defraud another man's estate.77
A century after Stein, the Court confirmed the importance of the
privilege in Wolfle v. United States: "The basis of the immunity given to
communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital
confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage
relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of
justice which the privilege entails."78
The Court again underscored the significance of the marital
communications privilege in American jurisprudence when, in Blau v.
United States, 79 it broadened the scope of its application. 80 Irving Blau
had refused to divulge the location of his wife to a federal grand jury
investigating Communist party activity, asserting that he had learned her
location from her in a confidential communication. 8' The district court
sentenced Mr. Blau to six months for contempt; the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, noting that he had not established that his wife meant the
compel production of audiotapes made by Bankers Trust of confidential telephone calls
between employee and his wife).
74. In diversity cases (or more technically, where state law provides the rule of decision),
state privileges apply. FED. R. EVID. 501; IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 4.2.3.
75. 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 209 (1839).
76. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 14.
79. 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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communication to be confidential.' The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that marital communications are presumed to be confidential.83
By presuming the confidentiality of marital communications, the Court
expanded the scope of the privilege.
Curiously, the Supreme Court's proposed federal rules of evidence
ignored this long history and refused to recognize a marital
communications privilege, choosing to retain instead the adverse
spousal testimonial privilege, presumably because it more transparently
served instrumental goals. '  However, during the congressional
hearings, so many witnesses objected to the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize the marital communications privilege that the rejection of this
long-recognized privilege was rescinded.85
The marital communications privilege serves the same policy goals
as other testimonial privileges. From the humanistic perspective, early
courts felt a "natural repugnance" at forcing one spouse to testify
adversely to "his intimate life partner."' There was a "humane 'feeling'
and 'sentiment' that it is morally 'repellant' to require" one spouse to
testify against another.8 Under this approach, the spouse's testimony
itself-without regard to any other consideration-is considered a
"betrayal."' From the instrumental perspective, courts express concern
that adverse spousal testimony would "be a cause of implacable discord
and dissention" between spouses. 9  Thus, like the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, the marital communications privilege "preserve[s]
the peace of families." 9 Under this approach, the privilege protects and
promotes a relationship that the community believes should be fostered
because, without the protection of the privilege, spouses: (1) might not
82. Id. at 333.
83. Id. ("marital communications are presumptively confidential").
84. Proposed Rules, supra note 14, at 244 (Proposed Rule 505).
85. See, e.g., Supplement, supra note 20, at 50 (Statement of Senator John McClelan), 79
(statement of Alvin Hellerstein on behalf of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York), 90 (statement of Robert Meisenholder on behalf of the Washington State Bar
Association), 333 (statement of Neil Falconer); Hearings, supra note 6, at 7 (testimony of
Rep. Bertram Podell), 349 (statement of Murray Hunter, M.D., on behalf of Fairmont Clinic,
Fairmont W. Va.).
86. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2228, 2333
(1961).
87. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 2.3.
88. Id.
89. Id. at § 2.4 (SIR EDWARD COKE ET AL., A COMMENTARIES UPON LITTLETON 6b
(1628)).
90. Id. (citing Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736)).
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confide in their partners or (2) might lie to protect their partners.9 '
IV. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE DEVELOPED PRIVILEGE LAW IN THE
LIGHT OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE
Since the Rules were adopted, the judiciary has followed its mandate
to develop federal privilege law "in the light of reason and experience."
In the last thirty years, federal courts have confirmed the privileges that
existed at common law before the Rules were adopted and have
addressed new privileges, all "in the light of reason and experience. ' 9,
In recognizing new privileges under Rule 501's mandate, courts
consider several factors: (1) whether federal policy supports the
privilege; (2) whether states have recognized the privilege; (3) whether
the privilege serves the same policy goals that traditionally have
informed the development of privileges at common law; and (4) whether
scholars have advocated for the privilege's adoption.
For example, in 1996, the Supreme Court confirmed the privilege for
confidential communications between psychotherapists and their
91. Louisell, supra note 27, at 102. Although this Article does not address the efficacy of
the privilege, it would be well to note that some have argued that unlike other protected
relationships in which one party is a professional (e.g., attorney-client or physician-patient),
spouses might not know that their communications are privileged. Thus, the privilege cannot
fairly be said to encourage freer communication. Proposed Rules, supra note 14, at 245-46
(Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 505, which states, "[n]or can it be assumed that marital
conduct will be affected by a privilege for confidential communications of whose existence the
parties in all likelihood are unaware"). However, there is no proof of this factual assumption.
Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 91. Even the purely instrumentalist Wigmore, who noted
that it "is not, and probably cannot be known" whether spouses would continue to share
confidences without the privilege, recognized the importance of the privilege nonetheless
because "the compulsory disclosure of marital secrets at least might cast a cloud upon an
essential aspect of the institution of marriage." WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2332. Of course,
in the thirty years since the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, Americans have gained
tremendous access to sophisticated legal issues through the media in ways the Advisory
Committee never could have anticipated. And while this argument may resonate with those
who question the need for the privilege in general, it bears not at all on the application of the
privilege to communications between same-sex, as opposed to heterosexual, partners. In
addition, although some may argue that fact finding in any particular case would be impaired
if the privilege were expanded, trial court fact finding "in this country has long been...
encumbered by exclusion of [privileged] evidence, yet does not appear to have suffered
noticeably for it." Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 93.
92. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (psychotherapist-patient); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (adverse spousal testimony); Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976) (lawyer-client); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (identity of an informer);
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (secrets of state); Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1 (1948) (required reports); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d. Cir. 1990)
(clergyman-penitent); Davis v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (trade
secrets); Miller, supra note 55 and accompanying text (political vote).
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patients and extended that privilege for the first time to confidential
communications made to a social worker rather than a psychotherapist.93
In Jaffee v. Redmond,94  a police officer sought therapy after
inadvertently shooting a civilian.9  The civilian's estate sued for
excessive force under federal statutes, making the litigation one of
federal question so that federal privilege law applied under Rule 501.
Both the social worker and the patient refused to disclose the substance
of the communications made during therapy. The district court
instructed the jury that it could conclude that the communications were
adverse to the officer's interest, and the jury rendered a verdict for the
civilian's estate.% The Seventh Circuit reversed, recognizing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege and extending it to the social worker.'
The Supreme Court affirmed. 9
Both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court noted Rule 501's
"affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege" but instead to
"provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis" in order to "continue the evolutionary development
of testimonial privileges."'9 And both courts reasoned that the privilege
ought to be recognized and extended to social workers because: (1) its
inclusion in the draft rules of evidence and its recognition by two courts
of appeals demonstrated its recognition in federal law;1°" (2) state courts
and legislatures had recognized it;' ° (3) it served the goals of
psychotherapy, whose importance had become more widely understood,
particularly in the five years prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision;' °2
and (4) scholars had commented on the importance of privacy in the
psychotherapist-patient relationship. 3
Like the Jaffee courts, federal courts that have recognized a parent-
child confidential communications privilege have based their holdings
93. Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3-4.
96. Id. at 4-5.
97. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F. 3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995).
98. The Seventh Circuit had adopted a balancing test for determining when the privilege
should apply. Id. at 1357. The Supreme Court struck the balancing test in favor of greater
predictability. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17-18.
99. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980));
Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1354 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
100. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1354-56.
101. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-15;Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356-57.
102. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-13;Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-56.
103. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-12; Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356.
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on a similar analysis. First, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto),'4
the court noted the expansive scope of Rule 501's mandate, referring to
Krattenmaker's theory that Rule 501's enactment in the face of the
proposed rules, which offered little protection to interpersonal
communications, "clearly reveals that Congress was motivated
substantially by disagreement with the Advisory Committee's position
that federal recognition of interpersonal testimonial privileges ought to
be cut back."'' 5 The Agosto court explained that Rule 501 "recognized
and arguably even advocated the evolution of new testimonial privileges
as they were deemed necessary by courts in the future."" The Agosto
court recognized a parent-child privilege based on: (1) the privilege's
ability to serve traditional instrumental goals for confidential
communication privileges;" and (2) the fact that scholars had advocated
for its adoption."
Second, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings Unemancipated Minor
Child,'°9 the court similarly found, following the dictates of Rule 501,
that "reason and experience, as well as the public interest, are best
served by the recognition of some form of a parent-child privilege.""0.. In
conducting its analysis, the Unemancipated Minor Child court explored
both a federal constitutional and a federal common law basis for the
privilege."' Concluding first that there was no constitutional basis for the
privilege, the court considered and found a federal common law basis by
looking to previous federal court opinions, 2 to state legislative
decisions,"3 to traditional rationales for testimonial privileges, 4 and to
scholarly advocacy for the privilege's adoption."5  Notably, the
Unemancipated Minor Child court requested that its opinion be
published because "the development of the federal common law-
including recognition of new privileges and the honing of time-honored
ones-is uniquely dependent on judges writing and publishing opinions
104. 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
105. Id. at 1324.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1308-10 (applying Dean Wigmore's test for recognizing new privileges).
108. Id. at 1304-08.
109. 949 F. Supp. 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1996).
110. Id. at 1497.
111. Id. at 1489.
112. Id. at 1495.
113. Id. at 1493.
114. Id. at 1494-95.
115. Id. at 1495-96.
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that reflect the common law's 'reason and experience."'" 6 Finally, the
Fifth Circuit has stated that it might consider recognizing a parent-child
privilege under Rule 501's analysis.1
7
Any federal court considering an expansion of the marital
communications privilege to protect confidential communications
between same-sex partners likely will explore the same multifactor
analysis used by these courts.
V. PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SAME-
SEX PARTNERS
The debate over privileges raises the question of the relationship
between the private citizen and the state-the issue "at the center of the
contemporary debate about the foundations of liberal society.
11 8
Today, no relationship underscores the debate between private citizens
and the state more clearly than the relationship between a same-sex
couple and the state. 9 Thus, it has been proposed that federal courts
consider, "in the light of reason and experience," whether the marital
communications privilege should protect confidential communications
between same-sex partners.
No federal court has yet addressed the issue. However, considering
the great swath of federal question litigation to which federal privilege
law applies, it is likely simply a matter of time before a federal court is
faced with the question. For example, in Patches v. City of Phoenix,12 a
police officer who had been disciplined sued the city for discrimination
based on gender and sexual orientation in violation of Title VII and §
1983." ' Among other complaints, Officer Patches argued that the City
116. Id. at 1495 n.11.
117. Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Were this a Rule 501 case our
holding [that there is no constitutionally mandated parent-child privilege in a criminal case]
might be different, since, in terms of the interests at stake, this case presents a compelling
argument in favor of recognition."). Of course, federal courts also have refused to recognize
a parent-child privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 1982 WL
597412 (D. Conn. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1985).
118. Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984
DUKE L.J. 631, 662.
119. EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE & THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2004)
("Same-sex marriage is one of the issues that most directly challenge our commitment to
genuine legal equality."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From
Jim Crow to Same Sex Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456, 2473 (1994) ("[T]he question of the
legality of same-sex marriages has bullied its way to the front of the constitutional agenda.").
120. 68 Fed. Appx. 772, No. 02-15408, 2003 WL 21206120 (9th Cir. May 12,2003).
121. Id.
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discriminated against her when it prohibited her from discussing the
disciplinary proceedings with anyone other than her "attorney, minister,
union representative or spouse" because she could not, by definition,
have a spouse since she and her partner could not wed.12 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the summary judgment entered against Officer Patches,
finding that she had not introduced evidence of discriminatory intent.23
Although it did not arise directly in Patches, it is foreseeable that a party
in a Title VII, § 1983 or other federal question litigation may invoke the
privilege to protect his or her confidential communications with a same-
sex partner. In considering whether to extend the federal marital
communications privilege to confidential communications between
same-sex partners, federal courts likely will consider the following: (1)
whether federal policy supports the privilege; (2) whether states have
recognized the privilege; (3) whether the privilege serves the same
policy goals that traditionally have informed the development of
privileges at common law; and (4) whether scholars have advocated for
the privilege's adoption.
A. Federal Policy
There has been no expressed federal policy concerning the privacy
of communications between same-sex partners, and federal policy with
respect to other issues concerning same-sex partners has been varied.
First, in 1996 Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").124 DOMA relieves any
state from recognizing a same-sex marriage sanctioned by another state.
Although couched in the language of states' rights, DOMA's history
reveals that it is an expression of federal legislative policy disfavoring
same-sex marriage. The constitutionality of DOMA has not yet been
tested, though recent developments regarding the legitimacy of same-
sex marriage suggest that it may soon be challenged. Although it is
unclear whether DOMA would be found constitutional, recent courts
have been more open to applying heightened scrutiny to state actions
that derogate the rights of same-sex partners.125 Moreover, "many court
watchers believe that [by 2006 or 2011] the U.S. Supreme Court will
hold that there is a constitutional right to homosexual marriage.' ' 26 Of
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
125. GERSTMANN, supra note 119, at ix-xi.
126. Robert Bork, Stop Courts From Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001,
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course, DOMA addresses same-sex marriage, but is silent as to rights
and privileges (including evidentiary privileges) granted to other forms
of same-sex partnerships, suggesting that DOMA does not illustrate
federal policy with respect to protecting confidential communications
between same-sex partners.
Second, the Supreme Court recently held that the Constitution
protects the right of consenting adults to privately engage in same-sex
sexual activities.1 17  In Lawrence v. Texas,'2 the Court expressly
overruled the 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick129 decision, which had found that
such activities were not constitutionally protected.'9 The Lawrence
Court reasoned that: (1) "States with same-sex prohibitions have moved
toward abolishing them," 3 ' (2) there exists "an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,, 13 2 and (3)
"[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for [the
same] purposes.., as heterosexual persons do., 13  Of course, although
Lawrence expresses a federal judicial policy that same-sex partners
ought not to be considered criminals for their sexual activities, the
opinion does not address whether same-sex partners ought to receive
any affirmative rights or privileges, including evidentiary privileges.
Most recently, the Supreme Court let stand the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health"M that legalizes same-sex marriage, suggesting at the very least a
policy of tolerance toward granting rights to same-sex partners.
A federal court considering whether to protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners would likely weigh these
federal precedents, and possibly others yet to emerge, to discern how
federal policy affects the decision.
at A14.
127. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
128. Id.
129. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
130. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
131. Id. at 570.
132. Id. at 572.
133. Id. at 574.
134. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
135. Largess v. Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass., 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, -- U.S. -- ,
125 S.Ct. 618 (2004).
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B. States' Approaches to the Privilege
Unlike the federal government, some states have directly addressed
the question whether confidential communications between same-sex
partners should be privileged.
California and Vermont protect confidential communications
between same-sex partners. In 1999, the Vermont legislature, instructed
by the Vermont Supreme Court,"' passed the state's Civil Unions Act, a
new chapter added to Vermont's Domestic Relations Code.'37 Section
1204 of the act, entitled "Benefits, protections and responsibilities of
parties to a civil union," sets forth a "nonexclusive list of legal benefits,
protections and responsibilities of spouses, which shall apply in like
manner to parties to a civil union" and explicitly includes "laws relating
to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communication
privilege."1 "
In 2003, the California Legislature passed A.B. 205, the Domestic
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003. The Bill was signed by
Governor Davis on September 19, 2003 and became effective January 1,
2005.139 The initial text of California's Act extended to same-sex
partners in civil unions a nonexhaustive list of rights and obligations."
With respect to evidentiary privileges, the Act as introduced explained
that "California has no legitimate state interest in denying to persons in
domestic partnerships.., benefits including, without limitation, Laws
relating to domestic relations, including, but not limited to, rights and
obligations of financial support during and after the relationship,
community property, and evidentiary privileges.' 41  The enumerated
benefits were removed in the March 24, 2003 version of the bill, in favor
of a broad statement that "[t]his act is intended to help California...
provid[e] [to] all caring and committed couples, regardless of their
gender or sexual orientation, the opportunity to obtain essential rights,
protections, and benefits ... to further the state's interests in promoting
stable and lasting family relationships.' 4 2
136. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that "the State is
constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections
that flow from marriage under Vermont law" and ordering the state legislature to draft an
appropriate statute).
137. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201-1207 (2004). The act became effective in 2001. Id.
138. Id. § 1204(e)(15).
139. 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 421 (A.B. 205).
140. A.B. 205, as introduced January 28, 2003, § 1(b)(8) (emphasis added).
141. A.B. 205, as introduced January 28, 2003, § 1(b)(8) (emphasis added).
142. 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 421 (A.B. 205) § l(a).
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Although Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey have enacted domestic
partnership statutes, they do not address the applicability of evidentiary
privileges to domestic partners.'43
On the other hand, at least one state has refused to extend the
privilege to communications between same-sex partners. In Greenwald
v. H&P 29th Street Associates,' the plaintiffs sued the owner and
managing agent of a rental property who refused to rent to them.'
During the litigation, the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple, asserted the
marital communications privilege under New York's statute.146 The trial
court refused to apply the privilege, denying the plaintiffs the protective
order they had sought.47 In a one-page memorandum decision, the
appellate division affirmed the denial of the protective order explaining
that New York's statute "by its terms, protects confidential
communications between a 'husband' and 'wife' 'during marriage' and
thus does not protect communications between same-sex couples.
Other states, while not addressing the privilege directly, have
addressed the issue of sanie-sex marriage. Many states have passed
baby-DOMAs (state versions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act),'4 9
143. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572(c) (Michie 1999) (Reciprocal Beneficiaries); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2710 (West Supp. 2004) (Domestic Partner Registry); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:8A (West Supp. 2004).
144. 659 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Since Greenwald was decided, New York has passed the Sexual Orientation Non-
Discrimination Act ("SONDA"), 2002 N.Y. Laws Ch. 2. SONDA bars discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in employment, education, housing, commercial occupancy, trade,
credit, public accommodations, civil rights, and other areas. Thus, it is possible that
Greenwald would be decided differently today. Other states whose antidiscrimination
statutes might protect confidential communications between same-sex partners include:
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A (West 2004 & Supp. 2005)); New Hampshire (N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A (1995 & Supp. 2004)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5 (West
2002 & Supp. 2004)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.10 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)).
149. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (1998)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011
(Michie 2004)); Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101, 25-112 (West 2000)); Arkansas
(ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 2001)); California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West
2004)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104 (West 1997)); Delaware (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1999)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (West 1997)); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-1, 572-3 (Michie
1999)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 1996)); Illinois (750 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN, §§
5/201, 5/213, 5/213.1 (West 1999)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 2003));
Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (1995 &
Supp. 2003)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1999)); Louisiana (LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. tit. IV, Art. 89 (West 1972 & Supp. 2005)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19a
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have amended their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage,"O or
both. Although the baby-DOMAs and constitutional amendments
express a policy disfavoring same-sex marriage, like the federal statute,
they express no policy with respect to granting other rights and
privileges to same-sex partners. Indeed, Vermont and California both
prohibit same-sex marriage but simultaneously protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners."'
Finally, one state has legalized same-sex marriage, resolving the
question definitively. In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decided Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.152
With Goodridge, Massachusetts became the first state to recognize
same-sex marriages, as opposed to same-sex civil unions.'53 The
§ 701 (West 1964 & Supp. 2004)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West 1988 &
Supp. 2004-05)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 1990 & Supp. 2005));
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-112 (1994 & Supp. 1999)); Missouri (MO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 451.022 (2003)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN.,§ 40-1-401 (2003)); New Hampshire
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1,457:2,457:3 (2004)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-
1.2 (2003)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (2004)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson 2003)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2001 & Supp.
2005)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1704 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)); South
Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law Co-Op 1985 & Supp. 2004)); South Dakota (S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-38 (Michie 2004)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001));
Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004-05)); Utah (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-4 (1998 & Supp. 2004)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2004));
West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603 (Michie 2004)). Washington's DOMA was
declared unconstitutional in Castle v. Washington, 2004 WL 1985215 (Wash. Super. Sept. 7,
2004).
150. Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. amend. 83);
Georgia (GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, I); Hawaii (HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23); Kentucky (KY.
CONST. § 233A); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25);
Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A); Missouri (MO. CONST. art. 1, § 33); Montana
(MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 7); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art.
1, § 21); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. 11, § 28); Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11);
Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. 15, § 5a); and Utah (UTAH
CONST. art. 1, § 29).
151. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (1999).
152. 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
153. Hawaii was technically the first state to recognize same-sex marriage. In 1993 the
Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the state's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii state constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny analysis). The court specifically noted that
marriage would extend to the plaintiffs "the benefit of the spousal privilege." Id. at 59. In
response, five years later, the Hawaii state legislature passed the marriage amendment to
Hawaii's constitution, declaring that marriage was reserved for heterosexual couples. Haw.
Legis. H.B. 117 (1997). The next year, Hawaii's supreme court recognized that the marriage
amendment precluded it from affirming its 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin. Baehr v. Miike,
994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). Although Hawaii has effectively foreclosed the possibility of same-
sex marriage, the state has not directly addressed the question of rights (including the
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Goodridge Court noted that the "benefits accessible only by way of a
marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and
death"'5 4 and that among these benefits are "evidentiary rights, such as
the prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about
their private conversations."'55 The court then observed that "[limiting
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-
sex couples violates the basic premises of individual liberty and equality
under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution."'56 On May 17,
2004, Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same sex
partners, although the state has limited eligibility to receive a license to
Massachusetts residents.5 7  Massachusetts' expressed policy favoring
same-sex marriage necessarily encompasses the less aggressive policy of
granting rights to same-sex partners.
A federal court considering whether to protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners likely will weigh these state
precedents, and possibly others yet to emerge, to discern how states'
approaches affect the decision.
C. Policies Traditionally Served by the Privilege
Scholars have variously articulated the traditional rationales for
recognizing confidential communications.
Both Wigmore and Krattenmaker propose instrumentalist tests.
Wigmore's test recognizes a new privilege if:
(1) The communications... originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality [is] essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
(3) The relation [is] one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications [is] greater than the
evidentiary privilege) and obligations that attach to same-sex partnerships other than
marriage.
154. 798 N.E.2d at 955.
155. Id. at 956.
156. Id. at 968.
157. Yvonne Abraham & Rick Klein, Free to Marry: Historic Date Arrives for Same-Sex
Couples in Massachusetts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2004, at Al; Yvonne Abraham & Elise
Castelli, Couples Launch Gay Union Lawsuit, BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at B1.
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benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.'
This purely instrumentalist analysis requires not only that society
believe a particular relationship ought to be preserved and protected,
but also that the privilege actually preserve the relationship in which the
communication was made. Indeed, because it requires a cause and
effect analysis (presumably with sufficient supporting evidence to
demonstrate the causal relationship), if it were strictly applied, it would
eliminate any privilege as to which it could not be proven that the
privilege actually furthers what in society's judgment is "useful"
communication. 9 However, even Wigmore recognized the importance
of the marital communications privilege without such proof.'
60
Under this strict instrumental approach, one must identify both a
goal served by the privilege and evidence that the privilege achieves that
goal. A federal court considering whether to protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners under Wigmore's test might
articulate the first goal as the concern that, without the privilege, people
will choose not to pursue same-sex partnerships.' A second goal might
be that same-sex partnerships will not be as fulfilling as they could be
because the partners, fearful of their confidences being betrayed, will
choose not to confide in each other.' A third goal might be that
158. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2285.
159. Louisell, supra note 27, at 111. ("Wigmore ... has conduced to the current
confusion by his emphasis on strictly utilitarian bases for the privileges-bases which are
sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation."); Krattenmaker, supra note 25,
at 91 (Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 505, explaining why marital
communications privilege was eradicated, "embody empirical assumptions that are dubious at
best ... to the [Advisory Committee's] wholly unsupported assertion that married couples
,are unaware' of the privilege they typically possess, it might be sufficient to simply argue that
a poll be taken, and dare the Committee to wager on the outcome."). Even Wigmore
recognized this weakness, when he commented that "whether this argument [that absent the
protection of the privilege, spouses would choose not to share confidences with each other] is
well founded is not, and probably cannot be, known." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 86, § 2332.
160. Wigmore, supra note 86, § 2332.
161. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR. supra note 34, § 5574 n.40 ("[W]hatever the
appropriateness of limiting the concept of 'marriage' to Noah's ark couples, it does not follow
that people barred from marriage ought to be discouraged from forming long term
relationships .... ). Some may argue that society ought not encourage its citizens to pursue
same-sex partnerships, either directly or indirectly. This is a purely political argument; an
instrumentalist seeking to discredit the value of extending the privilege would argue instead
that same-sex partners have formed bonds without the benefit of the privilege, thus negating
any evidence that the privilege achieves its goal.
162. Louisell, supra note 27, at 113 ("A marriage without the right of complete privacy
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without the privilege, same-sex partners might lie to protect themselves
or their spouses.63 Because a strict instrumental approach requires
evidence that the privilege would achieve these goals, any court that
applies this test is unlikely to extend the marital, communications
privilege to same-sex partners.
Krattenmaker similarly posits that courts should consider the
following factors when recognizing testimonial privileges:
(1) What privacy the privilege is protecting;
(2) What individual and societal benefits flow from public
protections afforded that privacy;
(3) Whether a testimonial privilege actually contributes to
that end; and
(4) Whether less drastic means might work. 65
However, unlike Wigmore, Krattenmaker argues strongly for
recognizing privileges to protect confidential communications between
parent and child, between counselor and client, and even between
roommates.' 66 Krattenmaker's flexible application of the instrumental
rationale reflects an openness to recognizing new privileges that
of communication would necessarily be an imperfect union. Utter freedom of marital
communication from all government supervision, constraint, control or observation, save only
when the communications are for an illegal purpose, is a psychological necessity for the
perfect fulfillment of marriage."). Again, some may argue that society has no legitimate
interest in making same-sex partnerships as fulfilling as they can be. Others already have
noted that if citizens are going to engage in same-sex marriages, society does have an interest
in making sure that those marriages are as strong and healthy as they can be. See, e.g., 15
V.S.A. § 7 History (2000) ("The state has a strong interest in promoting stable and lasting
families, including families based upon a same-sex couple.").
163. Wigmore would have thought this highly unlikely. He believed that even the
physician-patient privilege was unnecessary since, under his analysis, no patient would
withhold information from his or her physician based on the fear it would later be disclosed in
court. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 3.2.3. Today, a different analysis may yield different
results. For example, a patient who fears he might have been exposed to HIV may withhold
potentially relevant information about how he might have been exposed from his physician
because he lives in a state where same-sex sexual conduct is criminally punishable or might
result in a derogation of his rights in a civil litigation context (e.g., his parental rights might be
affected).
164. 25 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR. supra note 34, §5574 (SUPP. 2003) ("[I1f the privileges
are ever to be extended to nonmarital relationships, it seems likely that this will be the result
of either greater emphasis on the noninstrumental justifications for the privileges or of
legislative enactment.")
165. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 86.
166. Id. at 94.
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Wigmore's analysis does not.67
Finally, Edward Imwinkelried's test is a humanistic, rather than an
instrumental, one. It asks:
(1) whether the relation is a consultative one;
(2) whether there is a relatively firm societal understanding
that the consultant's duty is to help the other person
pursue his or her interests and make a choice; and
(3) whether the consultative relationship is centered on
choices in an area of the person's life implicating a
fundamental life preference.168
Imwinkelried argues that "in the future in developing privilege doctrine,
courts should place greater stress on non-instrumental, humanistic
considerations.,, 169 His test reflects this approach by omitting the cause-
and-effect analysis required by instrumentalists. Imwinkelried expresses
the classic humanistic sentiment when he observes that "[w]henever
there is a significant risk to the independence of a citizen's fundamental
life preference choice, a liberal democracy should take affirmative steps
to safeguard the autonomy of the choice."17  Such respect for and
protection of individual autonomy is the hallmark of a liberal
democracy; its absence is the hallmark of regimes that stand in sharp
contrast to the principles of American jurisprudence."
A citizen's choice to embrace privacy first was articulated as a legal
167. Louisell, supra note 27, at 111 (Wigmore's "strictly utilitarian bases for the
privileges.., are sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation.").
168. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 5.4.3.
169. Id. § 2.3.
170. Id. § 5.3.3.
171. Consider, for example, that in Nazi Germany attorneys had a duty to reveal a
client's confidential communications if the client's position was adverse to the collective
position of the party. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 5.3.3. Consider also the hostility
toward autonomous thought that forms the leitmotif of classic dystopian tales. See, e.g.,
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 5 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1949) ("You had to
live.., in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard...."), 210-11 ("A Party
member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police. Even when he is alone
he can never be sure that he is alone .... A Party member is expected to have no private
emotions...."); ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD & BRAVE NEW WORLD
REVISITED 235 (Harper & Row 1965) (1932) ("'But people never are alone now,' said
Mustapha Mond. 'We make them hate solitude; and we arrange their lives so that it's almost
impossible for them ever to have it."'); RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 58 (Simon &
Schuster Inc. 1993) (1951) ("We must all be alike. Not everyone born free and equal, as the
Constitution says, but everyone made equal.") (emphasis in original).
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right in the United States with the 1890 publication of Samuel Warren's
and Louis Brandeis's epochal12 article, The Right to Privacy, in the
Harvard Law Review.' Warren and Brandeis argued that the elevation
of privacy to a legal right was a natural step in the development of the
law. 7 4  The humanistic rationale for extending the marital
communications privilege recognizes the fundamental truth that privacy,
autonomy, and choice hold the same value for participants in a same-sex
partnership as they do for participants in a heterosexual marriage."7
A federal court considering whether to protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners under Imwinkelried's test
might note that courts already have admitted evidence and heard
arguments that same-sex partnerships involve the same devotion
between partners as do heterosexual marriages; 76 that same-sex partners
love each other as much as heterosexual spouses do;7 7 that same-sex
partners care for their families together, including parents and children,
as heterosexual spouses do;' 78 that same-sex partners' love is exclusive
and long-term, as heterosexual spouses' love is;' and that same-sex
couples want to be bound by their commitments in the same way that
heterosexual spouses are bound.'8 Under this analysis, a court may
172. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 5.3.3 (Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law
School was the first to label the article "epochal.").
173. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
174. Id.
175. Indeed, given their position as a disfavored minority, it is likely that same-sex
partners look to the State to protect their privacy, autonomy, and choice more than
heterosexual spouses do. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 51 (James Madison)
321 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) (1778); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural
Address (March 4, 1801) ("All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the
will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that
the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate would be
oppression.").
176. See, e.g., Appellants' Brief, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (filed Nov. 8, 2002); Petitioners' Brief at 16-19, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (filed Jan. 16, 2003).
177. Appellants' Brief at 3, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (No. SJC-08860) (filed Nov. 8, 2002) ("Hillary Goodridge and Julie Goodridge
celebrated their fifteenth anniversary in April 2002 and live in Boston with their seven-year-
old daughter. They seek to marry because they love one another.").
178. Id. at 3 ("David and Rob took care of David's parents when they were ill.").
179. Id. at 4-5 ("Maureen Brodoff and Ellen Wade ... have enjoyed an enduring and
loving partnership for over twenty-one of those years."), 7 ("Gloria Bailey and Linda Davies
... celebrated their thirtieth anniversary in March 2002.").
180. Id. at 6-7 ("They seek marriage to make binding their love and commitment to one
another...."); see also GERSTMANN, supra note 119, at 6 ("Gays and lesbians crave entry to
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conclude that it is "morally repugnant" to force one partner to testify
against another in a same-sex partnership; the testimony itself is as much
a betrayal to a same-sex partnership as it is to a heterosexual marriage.'81
D. Scholarly Approaches to the Privilege
At least two scholars have specifically advocated protecting
confidential communications made between same-sex partners.
Kenneth Graham has noted that he would be "happy to abolish the
'normative distinction' [between heterosexual and homosexual love], at
least insofar as it affects privilege."' And Jennifer Brannen argues that
"[e]xtension of the marital [confidential communications] evidentiary
privilege would insure procedural fairness."'83
Several other scholars have argued generally for extending the
protection of a confidential communications privilege beyond a married
husband and wife. As one group noted, "[m]any other relationships are
also intimate and loving." ' 84  Similarly, Krattenmaker argued for
adopting "a broader privilege for confidential communications
generally,"'85  suggesting that federal courts retain authority to
"examin[e] upon their merits further claims of testimonial privilege with
respect to personal confidential communications," including confidences
"between parent and child or counsellor and client or roommate and
roommate."' 86 Indeed, he even proposed that "[a] general, qualified
privilege for confidential communications that pass between individuals
intimately related or in a position of close personal trust should be
adopted."' 8 A federal court considering whether to protect confidential
communications between same-sex partners likely will weigh these
scholars' opinions, and possibly others yet to be expressed, to discern
how academic approaches affect the decision.
this life-altering relationship that has meant so much to so many heterosexual couples.").
181. Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450,
1590-91, nn.189-90 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
182. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR. supra note 34, § 5422.1, n.34; see also, Jennifer R.
Brannen, Unmarried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same-Sex
Couples, 17 REV. LITIG. 311,324 (1998).
183. Brannen, supra note 182, at 341.
184. Developments in the Law, supra note 181, at 1582 n.141.
185. Krattenmaker, supra note 25, at 94.
186. Id.
187. Id.; see also Angie Smolka, That's The Ticket: A New Way of Defining Family, 10
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 629 (2001) (advocating a "ticket system" under which rights,
including evidentiary privileges, traditionally reserved for family members, might be
allocated).
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VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
As federal courts consider protecting confidential communications
between same-sex partners under the federal marital communications
privilege, they likely will struggle most analytically with the requirement
of the "existence of a valid marriage." Indeed, many courts have
refused to extend the privilege to heterosexual, cohabitating partners on
the basis that they do not have a "valid marriage.''18
The concept of a valid marriage is dynamic and fluctuates with time
and culture."9 Consider, for example, that until the Supreme Court
decided Loving v. Virginia1 90 in 1967, a marriage between an African-
American and a Caucasian was considered invalid in sixteen states.1 9'
Courts already have dealt with the issue of the existence of a "valid
marriage" in the heterosexual context and their analysis in that context
could inform the analysis here: where the privilege is asserted but no
"official" marriage ceremony has occurred and no state-issued license
exists, courts ask whether a common-law marriage exists under state
law."9 Using this analysis, many courts refuse to apply the privilege.9
However, unmarried, heterosexual couples have been given the option
to marry and have chosen not to do so. Same-sex partners, with the
exception of Massachusetts residents, do not have the option to marry."
Thus, courts' refusal to extend the privilege to heterosexual common
law marriages is largely irrelevant to this analysis.
Rather, the test might be whether the parties have assumed the
benefits and burdens of a marriage. In the context of same-sex
partnerships, partners who have married' 95 or who have entered into a
civil union make the easiest candidates for extending the privilege.'
96
These partners have gone through the formal process of a ceremony,
and they have assumed the legal, financial, and other obligations
188. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
207 n.24 (2d ed. 2003) (collecting cases).
189. Milton C. Regan, Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV.
2045, 2065 (1995) ("What it means to be married is constructed and reconstructed on an
ongoing basis as the exigencies of daily life present legal issues that must be resolved.").
190. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
191. Id.
192. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 188, § 207 n.24 (collecting cases).
193. Id.
194. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 28, § 6.9.1 (a)(1).
195. To date, only Massachusetts allows same-sex partners to marry and, as of this
writing, Massachusetts grants this right only to its own residents. Abraham & Klein, supra
note 157, at Al; Abraham & Castelli, supra note 157, at Bi.
196. Brannen, supra note 182, at 338-39.
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attendant to a marriage. Indeed, whether same-sex partners have
availed themselves of whatever formalities are offered them has been
recognized as the test for extending to them other benefits in other
contexts. Thus, the New York courts have allowed a surviving same-sex
partner to pursue his claim under that state's wrongful death statute
because he and his partner had gone through the formalities of forming
a civil union under Vermont's statute and their relationship had other
indicia of a long term commitment.'9
In states where neither marriage nor a civil union is available,' 9
courts might inquire whether the partners have created as much of a
marriage as the law allows them to. For example, courts might consider:
(1) whether the partners cohabitate;
(2) whether the partners are jointly responsible for "basic
living expenses'' 9 or share other financial
responsibilities;
(3) whether the partners are both on the deed or lease to
their home;
(4) whether the partners have made provisions for each
other (e.g., are they named on each other's insurance
policies or in each other's wills?); or
(5) the length of the relationship and the intentions of both
partners regarding the permanence of relationship.2°°
In short, the practical considerations of extending the privilege to
same-sex partners are not insurmountable. 20 1 And litigants and courts
197. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 2003 WL 21294889 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 11, 2003)
(distinguishing Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 252 A.D.2d 369 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998),
because it was decided before Vermont enacted its Civil Unions Act).
198. Courts will have to address the question how far a same-sex couple may be required
to travel before the presumption that no civil union or same-sex marriage was available
should apply. For example, the Langan court noted that the plaintiff and his partner had
traveled from their home in New York to Vermont to be joined in a civil union. Langan,
2003 WL 21294889 at *1. Had they not traveled to Vermont, the court may have chosen to
consider that failure as evidence that they ought not be treated as spouses, given the
geographic proximity of New York and Vermont.
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004) (Domestic Partnership
Ordinance).
200. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 26:8A-4(b); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE, §
62.2 (2003).
201. It may be argued that such a factual inquiry will draw resources away from the issue
being litigated. However, courts regularly engage in factual inquiries unrelated to the central
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are becoming more accustomed to raising and addressing the issue.20
VII. CONCLUSION
At some point, federal courts likely will be asked to protect
confidential communications between same-sex partners under the
marital communications privilege. In conducting their analysis under
Rule 501's mandate to flexibly develop privilege law, courts will
consider: (1) federal policy; (2) state approaches; (3) policy goals that
traditionally have informed the development of privilege law; and (4)
scholarly commentary. Although each factor offers some precedent for
extending the privilege-the Supreme Court's Lawrence opinion, the
Vermont and California statutes, a liberal application of Krattenmaker's
and Imwinkelried's analyses, and Graham's and Brannen's advocacy-
realistically, most courts will view extending the privilege to same-sex
partners as a bold move approaching judicial activism. An immediate
and full-fledged extension of the privilege seems unlikely.
In the meantime, the debate between those who would protect
communications between same-sex partners and those who would not
more readily resembles the paradigmatic dispute between Antigone and
Creon.0 3 Those who, like Creon, believe the current, state-imposed laws
are inviolate will refuse the privilege. Those who, like Antigone, believe
the eternal laws of family loyalty and ethical choice supercede the state's
current pronouncement of the law will seek to apply the privilege. As
the two sides litigate the issue, federal courts will resolve it on a case-by-
case basis, "in the light of reason and experience."
issue being litigated. Consider, for example, the resources courts and litigants expend on
evidentiary hearings to determine the propriety of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
202. Rosie O'Donnell asserted the privilege in litigation with her publisher, Gruner &
Jahr Printing and Publishing Co., with respect to letters between her and her partner, Kellie
O'Donnell. O'Donnell Parties' Memorandum of Law (1) In opposition to Gruner & Jahr
Parties' Request to Revoke The... Spousal Privilege[ ], in Gruner & Jahr Printing and
Publishing Co. v. Rosie O'Donnell & Lucky Charms Entertainment, Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Index
No. 603581/02) (filed April 25, 2003) (on file with author). The discovery referee refused to
recognize the privilege, relying on Greenwald v. H & P 29th Street Assocs., 659 N.Y.S.2d 473
(1997). Order of Judge Burton S. Sherman, Retired, at 5 (filed May 15, 2003) (on file with
author).
203. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE (1977). In Sophocles' epic tragedy, Antigone insists on
providing her slain brother Polyneices with a proper funeral despite Creon's prohibition
forbidding any citizen from performing this rite. Id. at 186. The dispute between Antigone
and Creon has long represented the classic dispute between the individual and the state.
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